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“We expect more from technology and 
less from each other… Technology ap-
peals to us most where we are most vul-
nerable.. ”[1] 
 
Abstract 
This paper expresses a reflective approach to the 
themes and issues surrounding Sherry Turkle's new 
book, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from 
Technology and Less from Each Other. This can be 
seen as the culmination of a trilogy of books con-
cerned with human and computer relations and its 
implications for identity and psychology (The 
Second Self, 1984 and Life On the Screen, 1995). 
Turkle argues that, having already filtered compan-
ionship and relations through machines, we are now 
facing our own "robotic moment". Real life interac-
tions with flesh and blood people are becoming 
onerous and too stressful and untidy. Instead, we 
prefer to organise them through digital interfaces 
and ultimately even replace them with technological 
alternatives. In response to Turkle’s questions, we 
speculate: are we changing what it means to be 
human? Have we become over-reliant on technolo-
gy to mediate human relations? Does social net-
working encourage us to become narcissistic and to 
regard others as merely problems to be managed, 
resources to be exploited? And do we, the creative 
community, have some responsibility in considering 
these ethical dilemmas and making technologies 
that respond to these questions? Juxtaposed with 
Turkle’s insights is a commentary on the work of 
the neuroscientist Susan Greenfield. Her research 
on the neuroscience of identity offers a biological 
interpretation of how the brain adapts to environ-
ment which suggests that Turkle’s question of what 
it means to be human is complexified further by 
unprecedented changes to identity itself. 
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Introduction to Human Comput-
er Relations 
Sherry Turkle published The Second 
Self: Computers and the Human Spirit in 
1984 where she observed the changing 
relationship between people and tech-
nology, particularly computers. At the 
time she questioned the affect these new 
technologies are having on our lives, 
relationships and cognition. This is a 
theme that still runs through all of 
Turkle’s work as she analyses the chang-
ing role and social positioning of tech-
nology and human beings over time. In 
1984 Turkle was already questioning 
whether ‘machines’ were truly an exten-
sion of their users or whether they were 
something ‘other’. She defined machines 
as something ‘other’ if they imposed 
their own rhythm, pace and rules onto 
the person using them. In this case, 
Turkle observed, rather then humans 
simply using computers to extend their 
physical capabilities, as was previously 
the case with tools, the computer actual-
ly affected human cognition [2]. 
Through sustained interaction computers 
have successfully altered our pace, 
rhythm and sense of self. As society 
becomes more complex we develop new 
technologies to cope with our current 
situation, assuming that this will make 
things easier. However by developing 
new technologies we are inevitably 
changing the most fundamental of hu-
man principles: our conception of self, 
our relationships to others and our un-
derstanding and practice of love and 
death.  
In Turkle’s most recent book Alone 
Together: Why We Expect More from 
Technology and Less from Each Other 
[3] she considers how technology affects 
the younger generation’s definition of 
life, death and authenticity. She suggests 
that the mid-1990s saw a turning point 
for her research. She described two key 
developments, the first being the ‘fully 
networked life’ in which we are infinite-
ly connected to anyone from anywhere, 
and the second being the robotics 
movement. Turkle argues that what con-
nects these two seemingly disparate top-
ics is our reduced need for authenticity, 
especially within the younger generation. 
Turkle even documents cases where 
some children begin to preference their 
robotic pet over their current organic 
ones. When asked why, they simply state 
‘they are easier to care for and don’t die’ 
[4]. 
Perhaps we should consider the fact 
that although this may seem an obvious 
reaction to things that make us uncom-
fortable, we must consider what roles 
‘loss and forgetting’[5] play within soci-
ety and be very careful of attempting to 
erase the very aspects of randomness that 
also make life, people and relationships 
interesting, spontaneous and metamor-
phic. 
Brave New World 
Having asked what may be lost through 
the continual development of the compu-
tational technologies without a critical 
examination of the ethics posed by these 
new systems, this section aims to map 
out in greater depth the “future” fictions 
and narratives surrounding the current 
tableau of digital human relations. 
In literature which represents fictional 
societies, a number of novels portray 
ideas, characters and scenarios of future 
relations with technology. This is the 
case, for example, in George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, Aldous Huxley’s 
Brave New World, Ray Bradbury’s 
Fahrenheit 451, or Margaret Atwood’s 
The Handmaid’s Tale. The editor of an 
anthology based upon Ira Levin’s short 
story fiction This Perfect Day, Jeremy V. 
Pitt [6], makes the point that Science 
Fiction, as an extrapolation into the fu-
ture, is often rooted in the fears of its 
own present:  
“Tomorrow’s world is a place where 
computers rule, where monthly treat-
ments keep people docile, where sex is 
programmed weekly, and where death 
occurs at the age of sixty-two in the in-
terest of efficiency (...)”[7]. 
 
This Perfect Day, published in 1970, 
imagined a (supposedly) utopian global 
society governed by a single computer. 
At the time the novel was considered to 
be one of the great dystopian thrillers 
ever written—alongside Aldous Hux-
ley’s Brave New World (1932). In his 
introduction to Levin’s story in the an-
thology This Pervasive Day, The Poten-
tial and Perils of Pervasive Computing, 
Pitt notes that “in common with other 
science fiction novels of the time, [it] 
avoided apocalyptic nuclear conflict but 
touched a number of socio-technical 
nerves (or aspirations) of the time”[8]. 
We may debate whether or not the so-
cial, political, and/or technological de-
velopments surrounding pervasive 
computing may render Levin’s social 
vision plausible. Beyond that one may 
also ask whether it is feasible to build 
and program a computer to fulfill the 
functionality attributed to it in Levin’s 
book. What, then, is the potential — and 
what are the perils — of the necessary 
computing and communications technol-
ogy for the actual human society as we 
experience it in the twenty-first century, 
from social, legal, ethical, political, 
and/or economic viewpoints? Cultural 
critics such as Karen Barad [9], Lucy 
Suchman [10], and Donna Haraway [11] 
know how technology is taken up in, and 
influences, broader culture, as well as 
how cultural background can encourage 
the development of certain forms of 
technology and utopian discourse at the 
expense of other arguments and posi-
tions. 
 
Technological Provocations 
Susan Greenfield is a neuroscientist who 
wonders what the brain will physically 
look like in future generations. As articu-
lated in her book iD : The Quest for 
Identity in the 21st Century, her central 
anxieties are that galloping technological 
advances, and the social changes that 
they bring, will not only transform our 
sense of who and what we are, but might 
alter our identity to the point where we 
may no longer have the capacity to be 
fully developed persons [12]. Her predic-
tion is that interaction with technology, 
from mobile phones to video games, 
might produce a brain as a first-person 
perspective of identity that is stuck in 
what she terms “infancy immediacy”. 
Twenty-first-century technologies may 
bend our brains, and hence erode our 
identities, she argues, but in ways previ-
ous generations could not have envis-
aged. However none of the interesting 
questions about subjective identity and 
objective identification are explored in 
iD : The Quest for Identity in the 21st 
Century [13]. 
Greenfield argues that sensation has 
replaced cognition, process has replaced 
content and movement has replaced 
thought. In response to a question on a 
BBC Radio 3, Nightwaves BBC pro-
gramme [14], about how interaction with 
technology is responsible for this, Green-
field took up the theme of ecstasy, which 
in Greek means ‘to stand outside of 
yourself’. Greenfield drew upon this 
theme in order to explore the tension 
between, on the one hand, letting go and, 
on the other, achieving things and having 
a little niche, a personal identity, a brick 
in the wall. Anxiety over the stripping of 
cognitive content in the wake of rave 
music venues where flashing lights and 
sweaty bodies, loud music and abstract 
patterns propels Greenfield’s concerns. 
She further argues that the brain connec-
tions get meshed up and consequently 
sensory overload, in the moment, will 
give rise to a schizophrenia of the per-
petual present. But Greenfield’s point is 
that when individuals let themselves “go 
the focus is on the here and now, it’s the 
sensation that matters.”  
Greenfield fears that a child habituated 
to a “strong sensationalist present” will 
become addicted to thrill-bombardment, 
and that, instead of becoming Someone, 
the future human brain will remain No 
One – a collection of “inputs”, which is 
perhaps a rather gloomy view and rooted 
in the fears of the present. Following this 
line of thinking, cyberspace kids and 
teenagers, blitzed with information from 
anywhere and everywhere, may never 
acquire the capacity to see things in con-
text; they may never get beyond the 
stage of “taking the world at face value”. 
Does Greenfield reduce humanity to the 
“physicochemical context of the brain 
itself”?  
Greenfield is in agreement with other 
leading neuroscientists. “You are your 
brain”, said Nobel prizewinner Eric 
Kandel; “You are nothing but a bunch of 
neurons”, wrote Francis Crick, one of the 
co-discoverers of the structure of the 
DNA molecule in 1953. The problem 
with this reductionism is that it equates a 
part with the whole andeschews much of 
the complexity of thinking. The brain is 
not a problem-solving machine but an 
evolved organ adapted to enhance the 
survival changes of the organisms they 
inhabit. How does our brain assess cur-
rent situations? How does it compare 
them with past experiences? How are 
appropriate actions generated? It is this 
evolutionary imperative that has resulted 
in our large and complex brains. We 
don’t have a comprehensive brain theory 
that lets us bridge the gaps between mol-
ecules, cells and systems to enable us to 
begin to answer the questions: how do 
we experience and how do we remember 
what we wore when we were 4 years 
old? What images and sounds are mean-
ingful to us over our lifetimes? These get 
confused according to the stories we 
want to tell about ourselves. It is possible 
to stimulate particular brain regions to 
evoke sensations, memories, even emo-
tions, but does this mean that a particu-
larly memory can be located in that 
region or is it that the activity in that 
region is a correlate to the memory? The 
best anyone can do, in Greenfield’s 
view, is match up “biochemical process-
es with reports of how people feel”. We 
all have the hunch that incessant escape 
to cyberspace (youngsters are in front of 
screens six hours a day on average in the 
UK which correlates to some of Turkle’s 
findings in the USA) must be having a 
bad effect. In iD : The Quest for Identity 
in the 21st Century, Greenfield sets out to 
give this hunch respectable scientific 
backing. In summary, the implication of 
the book seems to be that when societies 
change, such as by developing new tech-
nologies, this must by extension alter the 
very physical make-up of the brain. In 
the chapter, "Twenty-First Century 
Thinking," Greenfield  suggests that the 
decline of reading in favour of fragmen-
tary encounters such a computer games 
or the internet, threatens the substance 
both of our neurological makeup and our 
social structures.  
 
Turkle: Alone Together: Why 
We Expect More from Technolo-
gy and Less from Each Other 
Sherry Turkle thinks it may be necessary 
to learn about the limitations as well as 
what we can know about our behavior 
and the brain. Right now we think we 
can look into the brain and see what’s 
happening and in her research she advis-
es that our cognitive faculties decay as 
we enter the marketization of life, live in 
the schizophrenia of the perpetual pre-
sent and skim distractedly from one 
webpage to another. 
The argument in Turkle’s Alone To-
gether: Why We Expect More from 
Technology and Less from Each Other, 
unfolds in two halves. The first section 
deals with objects that imitate living 
things. Turkle’s subjects, mostly children 
and the elderly, are given robot compan-
ions for varying lengths of time [15]. A 
bond is formed. Accordingly, the 
Furby – a fluffy, robot toy, which was 
popular in the late 1990s and looks part 
hamster and part owl and which is pro-
grammed to respond to human attention 
– exerts a hold over anyone who nurtures 
it for a few weeks.  
Turkle reports that scientists develop-
ing the latest robots report feelings of 
pseudo-parental attachment. In Turkle’s 
observations, the difference between 
playing with a doll and playing with a 
robot is the difference between pretence 
and belief. She argues that even when a 
replica behaves implausibly, we com-
pensate, filling the gaps in its repertoire 
with imagined feelings. This is perhaps 
not the sensory overload that Greenfield 
is skeptical of, but rather a move from 
the “robotic moment” of “infancy imme-
diacy,” sweaty bodies and flashing 
lights, to Turkle’s provocation of the 
“robotic moment” as companions are 
filtered through machines and robots are 
deployed in ‘caring’ roles. Children, she 
suggests, are no longer entertaining or 
nursing the elderly, filling gaps in the 
social fabric left where the threads of 
community have frayed. 
Sherry Turkle has been called the 
“Margaret Mead of digital culture” in her 
analysis of how young people navigate 
the emotional undercurrents in today’s 
technological world [16]. As an anthro-
pologist, Mead had been trained to think 
in terms of the interconnection of all 
aspects of human life so that the produc-
tion of food cannot be separated from 
ritual and belief, and politics cannot be 
separated from childrearing or art. This 
holistic understanding of human adapta-
tion allowed Mead to speak out on a very 
wide range of issues, and in particular 
the relationship between generations 
[17]. When she wrote of a global culture 
made possible by mass media, her words 
actually foresaw fundamental changes 
made by computer communication net-
works that were just beginning during 
the period in which she conducted her 
research. Mead believed that in the past 
culture was transmitted from an older to 
a younger generation through social ritu-
als and an exploration of what might be 
shared experience in the process of full 
attention face to face. Turkle argues that 
new technologies – including e-mail 
messages, Facebook postings, Skype 
exchanges, role-playing games, Internet 
bulletin boards and robots – have broken 
this tie. The more networked and wired 
we are, the more seduced and addicted to 
an ‘autistic’ world we become, where we 
expect more from technology and less 
from each other. Turkle isn’t just con-
cerned with the problem of on-line iden-
tity, she is disquieted by the banalities of 
electronic interaction, as a younger gen-
eration of Americans’ range of expres-
sion is constrained by gadgets and 
platforms, a networked life of loneliness 
and failed solitude. This implies an even 
greater separation between generations 
and cultures than ever before.  
 
At this point, Greenfield’s and 
Turkle’s ideas come perversely close, 
though both are writing from different 
disciplines and from different sides of 
the Atlantic. In spite of Facebook and 
Twitter, our strongest social relation-
ships still tend to be with those people 
we physically live near. Greenfield's core 
thesis is that one part of the brain may 
stimulate an apparently dissociated part 
in the creation of memories, attitudes 
and skills. If the brain is like anything, 
from a social point of view, it is like the 
distributed internet, not human relations 
which are enforced by our embodiment 
in the physical world.  One of the most 
pervasive metaphors in neuroscience is 
that brains are like computers, whereas 
Greenfield sees brains as akin to society, 
and consequently, society’s current so-
cial and technological troubles must 
even affect our neurons and synapses.  
 
From Turkle’s anxieties about teenag-
ers constantly performing on the digital 
stage to incipient roboticism, the ‘robotic 
moment’ is not a point in history but a 
threshold in ethics.  Ethical questions 
start to surface when we see robots as 
having subjectivity. Turkle is concerned 
about the way we set up such important 
social, ethical questions, “quandaries” 
she calls them, such as: “Do you want 
seniors lonely and bored, or do you want 
them engaged with a robotic compan-
ion?”  
She wants to make sure we’ve consid-
ered moral issues not only when setting 
up a quandary, but also when responding 
to it.  Turkle takes on this task by ques-
tioning how we think about our relation-
ship with technology and therein lies the 
challenge posed by Alone Together. 
 
Reconsidering our Relationship 
towards Technology 
As a final provocation we move from 
focusing predominantly on the dystopic 
issues addressed within Alone Together 
to considering if they can provide an 
adaptive framework for the design of and 
creative engagement with contemporary 
technologies in ways that might also be 
affective. Such technologies may involve 
playing with complicated themes such as 
loss and forgetting from a creative per-
spective without trying to hide from or 
eradicate them. 
In Alone Together Turkle argued that 
communication tools such as portable 
devices and, in general, the internet ‘on 
the go’ have created an escape window 
for people which didn’t exist before. 
This gateway allows users to sidestep 
whatever reality they are in, creating 
new realities in their “virtual” world.  
Turkle’s presentation on TED Califor-
nia in 2012, Connecting, but alone?, 
presents the view that human beings, as 
users, have always been obsessed with 
finding new ways of communicating 
through various computational technolo-
gies. We cannot deny that there has been 
a rapid technological change that allows 
us - the users - to communicate through 
alternative ways. However what is not 
addressed in Turkle’s writing is whether 
social networks or indeed robotics could 
be designed with these ethical stipula-
tions and concerns in mind, both as 
speculative art works and as practice-
based research [18] or interaction design 
[Mari Velonaki, panel discussion, 
ISEA). 
As humans continue to develop new 
technologies and new interfaces that are 
interconnected within our lives, creating 
social networks, we might reflect on 
Marshall McLuhan’s predictive state-
ment from 1962 that “the next medium, 
whatever it is - it may be the extension 
of consciousness”[19].  
We, as creatives and academics, con-
clude by suggesting that these statements 
are new challenges for us. As a commu-
nity we have a changing responsibility 
that places us at the core of how we 
might shape our brains and relationships 
to technology and other people, develop-
ing new strategies and ethics to compre-
hend and interact with contemporary 
technologies - guided by some of the 
warnings and speculative futures dis-
cussed within Turkle’s texts and Green-
field’s metaphorical musings.  
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